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We are grateful to Tim Schroeder, Alva Noë, Pierre Poirier, and Martin
Ratte for reading and criticizing our book. Interestingly, their three sets
of  comments (to which we shall respond in order) reflect three very differ-
ent standpoints on both vision and the science of  vision. 
 
1. Reply to Tim Schroeder
 
Tim Schroeder is a very sympathetic reader indeed. He raises two queries,
both of  which are well taken and go deep to the heart of  our framework. 
His first question is about the scope and limits of  our endorsement of  a









 if  the former has the function to track
(or be correlated with) instances of  the latter. As Schroeder notes, since
this account involves the notion of  tracking, it seems tailor-made for
belief-like (or “indicative”) mental representations with a mind-to-world
direction of  fit, whose function is to register the presence of  facts or
instantiated properties. Indeed, in the first section of  Chapter 1, we do
endorse this account for the contents of  visual percepts. 
The question Schroeder first raises is whether this teleosemantic
account could be extended to the contents of  intentions—motor inten-
tions, in particular—which, unlike beliefs and percepts, are “imperative”
mental representations with a world-to-mind (not a mind-to-world) direc-
tion of  fit, i.e., whose function is not to record facts, but to represent non-
actual possible states of  affairs and to contribute to turning them into
actual states of  affairs. In particular, we do agree with Schroeder that the





puts it, is to cause an agent to grasp, e.g., a cookie, and not to track her
grasping it. 
Schroeder’s question whether the teleosemantic account could be
extended to the contents of  mental representations with a world-to-mind
direction of  fit, or whether it should be restricted to the contents of  mental
representations with a mind-to-world direction of  fit, is an excellent one.




 teleosemantic accounts of  the contents of
“indicative” belief-like mental representations, not one that should be
particularly addressed to us. As Schroeder observes, we do hold that
motor intentions are mental representations and that they guide responses
that are actions, not reflexes. Furthermore, in §7 of  Chapter 6, we do
appeal to psychophysical experiments on illusory stimuli (i) exhibiting a
dissociation between perceptual responses and visuomotor responses and
(ii) showing that visuomotor representations can be fooled into represent-
ing two-dimensional features as three-dimensional features of  the visual
display. So, in order to argue that visuomotor representations of  a target
of  action are genuine mental representations, we do not, as Schroeder
notes, directly appeal to the fact that they have informational functions.
But, although Schroeder is right to say that our grounds for the claim that
visuomotor representations are genuine mental representations rest on
the fact that like visual percepts, they can be illusory, nonetheless what we
are arguing (in §7 of  Chapter 6) is that visuomotor representations are
genuine mental representations, not that motor intentions are. On our
view, the job of  a visuomotor representation is to present visual informa-
tion about a target of  action to an individual’s motor intention. In §8 of
Chapter 6, we further argue that since visuomotor representations present
visual information for the benefit of  an individual’s motor intentions (with
a world-to-mind direction of  fit), they are, like Millikan’s pushmi-pullyu
representations, hybrid representations (with both directions of  fit). So, in
a sense, on our own analysis, even though they present visual information
in a format suitable to motor intentions, it is nonetheless the function of
visuomotor representations to track facts. 
Further, Schroeder raises the query whether one can consistently think
of mental representations with a mind-to-world direction of  fit both as
physical structures with informational functions and as misrepresenta-
tions (e.g., visual illusions). We do think that one can and we also think
that Schroeder would probably agree with us about this. Here is why. On



















which is to indicate the presence of  some property. Since the former is a
sufficient condition for the latter, the two are consistent.  
Second, Schroeder offers an accurate account of  our grounds for our
claim that, unlike visual percepts, visuomotor representations fail to make




an agent visually aware of  her target, which is to say that, unlike a visual
percept, a visuomotor representation fails to satisfy the constraint of  con-
trastive identification. On the one hand, Schroeder presses us for more jus-
tification. The reason why, unlike visuomotor representations, visual
percepts do satisfy the constraint of  contrastive identification is that
visual precepts represent the spatial position of  an object in an allocentric
frame of  reference and not in an egocentric one. 
On the other hand, he offers one reason for scepticism and one straight
counter-example. His reason for scepticism is that people offered two dif-
ferent bars of  chocolate to taste might well claim that the two bars taste
different while being unable to state exactly how they are different. But the
fact that people fail to find words to express their experience of  the con-
trasting tastes (of  two chocolate bars) does not show that they are phe-
nomenally unaware of  the different tastes. What it may show is that,
although they do experience the contrasting tastes, they fail to conceptu-
alize and name the contrast. All the constraint of  contrastive identifica-
tion says is that the basis for visual consciousness of  an object lies in the
fact that the object’s visual features are made available for comparison. It
may well be that subjects will fail to report the result of  the comparison
unless they can name it and hence conceptualize it. 
Next, Schroeder offers a purported counter-example to our claim that,
unlike visual percepts, visuomotor representations fail the constraint of
contrastive identification. His counter-example is that, by using a visuo-
motor representation, an agent can orient her hand so as to match the ori-
entation of  a slot and thereby successfully insert a card into the slot. But,
according to Schroeder, she could not succeed unless she compared her
visuomotor representation of  the angle of  her hand (or wrist) with her
visuomotor representation of  the slot’s angle. “But,” Schroeder adds, “this
sounds like constrastive identification.” It would indeed so sound if  agents
did so proceed. But this is not how agents proceed, since such experiments
are performed in so-called “open-loop” condition, i.e., while agents have
no visual access to their own hand. Rather, what happens in such visuo-
motor tasks is that agents automatically calibrate the orientation of  their
hand with the orientation of  the slot. Similarly, in a visuomotor task of
grasping a target in an open-loop condition, the agent’s finger grip auto-
matically unfolds without the agent’s visual control of  her hand and finger
movements. 
 
2. Reply to Alva Noë
 
Whereas Tim Schroeder is sympathetic to our broad representationalist
framework for elucidating the puzzles of  human vision, Alva Noë thinks
it is deeply misguided. Noë ascribes to us a view of  visual experience,





fails to do justice to the two major functions of  visual experience: its
action-guiding role and its reference-grounding role. 
First, let us get rid of  a first putative misunderstanding raised by Noë’s
use of  the expression “the picture picture of  seeing.” As the passage from
our book quoted at the beginning of Noë’s comments shows, we do assume
that, unlike the conceptual content of  a thought, the non-conceptual con-
tent of  a visual percept cannot represent a mug as being to the left of  a
telephone without embedding this information within some richer and
more detailed information about how far the former is from the latter and
about the orientation, shape, size, colour, etc., of  both the mug and the
telephone. So, on our view, the non-conceptual content of  a visual percept
representing a mug to the left of  a telephone is pictorial to the extent that
it is informationally richer and more fine-grained than the conceptual
content of  a thought expressible by the use of  the English sentence “the
mug is to the left of  the telephone.” The latter can, but the former cannot
carry the information about the spatial relation between the mug and the
telephone without depicting the distance between them, the orientation,
shape, size, and colour of  both the mug and the telephone. Our official













 is a state produced by a mechanism with the function to









 is a state produced by a mechanism with the function to carry
information about the same state of  affairs in analog form. 
 However, as we point out in §2.3 of  Chapter 1, we emphatically reject
the view that what makes one visually aware of  a mug as being to the left
of  a telephone is one’s perception of  a mental picture (or sense-datum),
located in one’s mind (or brain), and representing a mug to the left of  a
telephone. One is made visually aware of  the mug and the telephone by a
physical process that starts when one’s retina is being hit by photons that
are reflected by these objects, which in turn leads to further visual process-
ing higher up in one’s visual cortex. 
Now, we fail to see why or how acceptance of  the distinction between
the conceptual content of  thoughts and the non-conceptual content of
visual experiences should force us to endorse a view of  the content of
visual experience as either “comparable to an unasserted propositional
content, or the content of  a Fregean thought” or as “a way of  encounter-
ing a pictorial description . . . of  the way a world might be.” Since we fully
acknowledge the point that visual percepts are caused by what they rep-
resent, we are committed to the view that visual experience represents
facts (or actual states of  affairs)—not “the way a world might be.” 
Second, Noë claims that our endorsement of  what he calls the “picture
picture of  seeing” commits us to a descriptivist account of  the content of
visual experience—an account which is, as he puts it, “the pictorial analog
of descriptions.” If  so, then it would be hard to see how visual experience




could secure reference to particular things and objects: it would be hard
to see how one could get reference to a particular object from a purely
descriptive representation of  it. Thus, our “picture picture of  seeing”
would make us unable to account for the reference-grounding role of
visual experience. This is, we take it, what Noë characterizes as the prob-








 with a certain appearance.” 
In response, we want to make two points. 
First, the content of  the verbal report of  a visual experience is one thing;
the content of  the reported visual experience is another. In the quoted pas-
sage from our book, we simply comply with the semantic and pragmatic
constraint according to which in verbally reporting the content of  a visual
experience of  the relation between a pair of  objects, the first time one
refers to the pair of  objects, one ought to prefix each noun phrase by an
indefinite description before being able to use some directly referential
expression (such as a demonstrative concept, e.g., “that mug”). But it
would be a mistake to infer that one accepts a descriptivist account of  the
content of  visual experience from the fact that the meaning of  the utter-
ance by means of  which one is verbally reporting the content of  the visual
experience includes the meaning of  an indefinite description. 
Second, although visual experience may well have a reference-grounding
role, nonetheless perceptual experience, on our view, is one thing and ref-
erence is something else. Arguably, one cannot visually experience the
shape and colour of  an object unless one perceives the object. But it is
necessary neither to refer to an object in order to visually experience its
shape and colour, nor to perceive an object in order to refer to it. Refer-
ence is achieved by thought, the content of  which may in turn include a
demonstrative concept of  the object referred to. If  it does not, then it
includes some descriptive concept instead. We thus submit that the ques-
tion whether a mental representation directly refers to an object or
whether it picks the object descriptively can only arise for representations
with some conceptual content or other, not for visual experiences with
non-conceptual content. 
Turning now to the action-guiding role of  visual experience, it is hard
to determine the extent of  our disagreement with Noë. Since we embrace
a version of  the two-visual systems model of  human vision, we certainly
do not deny that it is one fundamental function of  human vision to guide
action. But the fact that vision guides reaching and grasping does not
mean that visual experience does. We do not disagree with Noë when he
explicitly accepts the fundamental dissociation between the visuomotor
representation and the visual experience of  an object’s shape, as when he
writes: “you do not need consciously or attentively to experience the shape
of something to know roughly how far you need to separate your fingers









, however, we emphasize the distinction between lower and
higher levels of  the pragmatic processing of  visual information, involved
respectively in reaching-to-grasp a target and in the skilled manipulation
of tools. But recognition of  the existence of  levels of  both pragmatic and
semantic processing of  visual information is consistent with the basic
claim of  the two-visual systems model,, according to which visual experi-
ence can be dissociated from visually guided action. 
As our example of  the basket of  fruits (in the Précis) shows, visual expe-
rience is involved in the selection of  a target of  a low-level act of  reaching
and grasping. But it does not guide the fine-tuning of  the bodily move-
ments involved in grasping the target. As Noë notes, the brain could not
switch from the selection task to the visuomotor task unless it could trans-
form the allocentric representation of  the position of  the object (suitable
for perception) into an egocentric representation (suitable for acting on
the object). This is a straight scientific question. We fail to see what Noë’s
mysterious grounds are for asserting that it is a “deeper” and “intracta-
ble” problem. 
 
3. Reply to Pierre Poirier and Martin Ratte
 
Whereas Noë’s concern was that we might deprive visual experience of
both its action-guiding role and its reference-grounding role, Pierre Poir-
ier and Martin Ratte’s goal is to mount an attack on the role of  mental
representations in the explanation of  action. Their official perspective is
that of  dynamical systems theory, in which an agent and her environment
are two non-dissociable parts of  a system that seeks its own equilibrium.
It is instructive and challenging to see how a non-representationalist
framework radically different from our own might be developed as an
alternative account of  some actions. We shall first address some general
clarificatory issues. Then, we shall examine Poirier and Ratte’s criticism of
an argument in favour of  a representational approach to the explanation
of action they ascribe to us. Finally, we shall argue that their account is a
version of  behaviourism.  
To start with, we would like to make a couple of  general remarks, the
first of  which is that, from our standpoint, Poirier and Ratte’s version of
the dynamical theory of  action is hard to evaluate since they fail to engage
with the particular cases of  dissociation between visual processing accord-
ing to whether the task is perceptual or visuomotor, which are at the core
of  our own account. Our second clarificatory remark is that, contrary to
what Poirier and Ratte say, we do not intend our own representationalist
account of  the contribution of  the dorsal stream of  the human visual sys-
tem to be an account of  expert motor action (as exemplified by an experi-
enced tennis player). Our characterization of  the visuomotor trans-
formation (achieved by the human superior parietal lobule) is meant to be




an account of  the contribution of  low-level pragmatic processing of  visual
information to low-level acts of  reaching-and-grasping a target. Further-
more, we do emphasize the contribution of  the left inferior parietal lobe
to the higher-level pragmatic processing involved in the skilled manipula-
tion of  tools. And, unlike Milner and Goodale’s earlier version of  the two-
visual systems model, we do emphasize the contribution of  the right infe-
rior parietal lobe (hence, of  the dorsal stream) to visual consciousness.
We now move to Poirier and Ratte’s reconstruction and criticism of  a
putative argument in favour of  the role of  representations in the explana-
tion of  action they think we endorse. First of  all, we are reluctant to
endorse their reconstructed argument. Second, we do not really under-
stand part of  Poirier and Ratte’s answer to the argument. The reason we
think that we cannot endorse the reconstructed argument is that it is cast




. Poirier and Ratte ascribe to us the view that if  and
when an agent’s action can be both erroneous and sensitive to non-local
properties of  the agent’s environment, then it must be caused by the
agent’s mental representations. Now, from their comments, it is quite clear
that Poirier and Ratte equate action and motor output. Of course, an act
can be judged to be morally wrong, but, on our view, only a (mental or
non-mental) representation—not a motor output—can be erroneous in
the relevant non-moral sense: only representations can misrepresent
something or other. A motor output (or an executed action) can fail to sat-
isfy the intention (or desire) of  a healthy ageny—for some exogenous rea-
son or other, the execution of  an action may fail or abort. As neuro-
psychology shows, some apraxic patients do perform inappropriate
actions involving the skilled use of  tools. For example, an apraxic patient
might draw a toothbrush through her hair, instead of  using a comb. How-
ever, what her inappropriate act shows is that such an apraxic patient
either misrepresents the function of  the relevant tool or she associates an
inappropriate motor representation with her perception of  the tool. 
Nor do we really understand Poirier and Ratte’s argument that some
motor acts can be sensitive to non-local properties of  the agent’s environ-
ment. Their argument is puzzling for at least three reasons. They argue
that the activity of  area V1 of  the primary visual system can respond, not
just to retinal signals, but also to signals coming from other neighbouring
brain areas (such as V2). First of  all, in what sense should the activity of
V2 count as some non-local property of  the agent’s environment, relevant
to the activity of  V1? Second, the activity of  area V1 of  the primary visual
system is known to underlie visual experience, not motor acts. Far more
relevant to motor acts is the activity of  the primary motor area M1. Third,
the activity of  an agent’s brain area is not a motor act. The question they
should address, from their own perspective, is whether an agent’s motor
act is sensitive to some non-local properties of  the agent’s environment,





Finally, we want to explain why Poirier and Ratte’s version of  the
dynamical theory of  action seems to us suspiciously like a version of
behaviourism. On their proposed account, an agent’s action is a behav-
ioural response to some disturbance designed to re-establish a tempo-
rarily disrupted equilibrium in the dynamical system. Clearly, this account








 actions. But this restric-
tion runs against the scientific study of  motor cognition. As one of  us
(Marc Jeannerod) has argued in much of  his scientific career, there is much
empirical evidence that an agent’s motor system is activated in two situa-
tions in which he or she fails to perform any overt action. On the one
hand, parts of  an agent’s motor system are active when he or she plans
and/or imagines an action, which, for some reason or another, he or she
fails to execute. In fact, we all plan many actions that are never accom-
plished. On the other hand, some areas of  an observer’s motor and pre-
motor systems (e.g., mirror neurons) are active when he or she perceives
actions performed by another agent. This evidence suggests that much of
the activity of  an agent’s motor system underlies motor representations of
an action regardless of  whether the represented action is being performed
by the agent whose motor system is representing the action.
